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Abstract
This article provides evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal direc-
tions. Taking advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for
France, we compare consistently across-industry heterogeneity in rent-
sharing parameters relying on three diﬀerent approaches: (i) the produc-
tivity approach, (ii) the accounting approach and (iii) the traditional la-
bor economics approach. Focusing on economically meaningful parameter
estimates shows that there exist diﬀerences in dispersion across the diﬀer-
ent approaches but more importantly that the rent-sharing estimates are
within a comparable range.
JEL classiﬁcation : C23, D21, J31, J51.
Keywords : Rent sharing, wage equation, production function, matched
employer-employee data.
1 Introduction
The theoretical underpinnings of individual and ﬁrm wage heterogeneity can
broadly be classiﬁed into three categories: matching/search-based models (Jo-
vanovic, 1979; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Mortensen, 2003; Shimer, 2005),
incentive compensation models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and rent-sharing mod-
els (McDonald and Solow, 1981; Nickell and Andrews, 1983). Regardless of the
theoretical model one favors, the exclusion of unobserved individual or ﬁrm wage
∗We are grateful to Bronwyn Hall and other participants at the Danish Research Unit
for Industrial Dynamics (DRUID) Conference (Copenhagen, 2008) for helpful comments and
suggestions. All remaining errors are ours.
†Free University Amsterdam, Ghent University, IZA Bonn, visiting CREST. Postdoc-
toral Fellow of the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO). Corresponding author: sdobbe-
laere@feweb.vu.nl
‡CREST, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), MERIT-
Maastricht University, NBER.
1heterogeneity creates biases in wage equations as well as problems in identifying
the underlying sources of wage variation.
On the empirical side, there is a large body of studies examining the eﬀect of in-
dustry or ﬁrm performance on wages using aggregated data (among them Katz
and Summers, 1989, Blanchﬂower et al., 1996, Estevao and Tevlin, 2003 for
the US; Abowd and Lemieux, 1993, Christoﬁdes and Oswald, 1992 for Canada;
Blanchﬂower et al., 1990, Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991, Nickell et al., 1994,
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997 for European countries) and testing the rent-sharing
hypothesis. The seminal contribution of Abowd et al. (1999), providing a sta-
tistical decomposition of wage rates into worker and ﬁrm eﬀects and focusing on
the private sector in France, together with the availability of matched employer-
employee datasets, fueled a resurge of interest in this subject. Recent studies
investigating the impact of proﬁts on wages using matched worker-ﬁrm data
include Margolis and Salvanes (2001) for France and Norway, Arai (2003) for
Sweden, Kramarz (2003) for France and Martins (2007) for Portugal. Albeit
using diﬀerent models of collective bargaining, the results of these studies indi-
cate, in general, that changes in proﬁtability feed through into long-run changes
in wages.
The main contribution of this article to the latter strand of the empirical liter-
ature is to provide evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal directions. Taking
advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for France, this arti-
cle can be considered as a companion paper to our previous related research
(Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008) where we provide an in-depth analysis of im-
perfections in the product and the labor markets as two sources of discrepancies
between the marginal products of input factors and the apparent factor prices.
This article compares consistently across-industry heterogeneity in rent-sharing
parameters relying on three diﬀerent approaches: (i) the productivity approach,
(ii) the accounting approach and (ii) the traditional labor economics approach.
In the ﬁrst approach, we estimate a productivity equation at the ﬁrm level (see
Crepon, Desplatz and Mairesse, 1999; Dobbelaere, 2004,; Boulhol and Dobbe-
laere, 2006; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008). By comparing the estimated factor
elasticities for labor and materials and their shares in revenue, we are able to
derive estimates of average price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing parameters. In
the second approach, we directly compute measures of price-cost mark-up and
rent-sharing parameters from the ﬁrm accounting information (see also Veugel-
ers, 1989). In the third approach, we estimate directly a wage equation taking
into account worker and ﬁrm wage heterogeneity. From the estimated proﬁts-
wage elasticities, we retrieve average rent-sharing parameters. We compare the
estimated elasticities resulting from estimating a wage equation at the worker
level with those resulting from estimating a wage equation at the ﬁrm level.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the three approaches. Section
3 discusses the data and focuses on across-industry heterogeneity in extent of
rent-sharing parameters within each approach. In Section 4, we compare con-
sistently across-industry heterogeneity in our parameter of interest across the
three approaches. Section 5 concludes.
22T h r e e d i ﬀerent approaches to provide rent-
sharing evidence
In this section, we present three approaches from which we derive estimates of
extent of rent sharing: (i) the productivity approach, (ii) the accounting ap-
proach and (iii) the traditional labor economics approach. All three approaches
determine the extent of rent-sharing parameters that would prevail if bargaining
were to take place according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining model.
2.1 Productivity approach
We rely on the model of Cr´ epon, Desplatz and Mairesse (1999, 2002) that
extends Hall (1988)’s framework to allow for the possibility that wages and
employment are bargained over between ﬁrms and workers. We start from a
production function Qit = ΘitF(Nit,M it,K it),where i is a ﬁrm index, t a
time index, N is labor, M is material input, K is capital and F(.)i s a s s u m e d
to be homogeneous of degree one in its arguments. Θit is an index of technical








Kitkit + θit (1)
Each ﬁrm operates under imperfect competition in the product market. On the
labor side, we assume that the union and the ﬁrm are involved in a strongly
eﬃcient bargaining procedure with both wages (w)a n dl a b o r( N)b e i n gt h e
subject of an agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The union’s objective is
to maximize U(wit,N it)=Nitwit +( Nit − Nit)wit,w h e r eNit is union mem-
bership (0 <N it ≤ Nit)a n dwit is the outside wage available in the event
of a bargaining dispute (wit ≤ wit). Consistent with capital quasi-ﬁxity,1 the
ﬁrm objective is to maximize its short-run proﬁt function: π(wit,N it,M it)=
R(Nit,M it)−witNit−jitMit,w h e r eRit = PitQit stands for total revenue. The











where φit ∈ [0, 1] represents the workers’ bargaining power.
Maximization with respect to material input gives RM,it = jit with RM,it the
marginal revenue of material input, which directly leads to:
ε
Q
Mit = μitαMit (3)
1Cr´ epon et al. (1999, 2000) assume capital quasi-ﬁxity. In their framework, what only
matter is that capital is installed before bargaining takes place, which is a very reasonable
hypothesis. When assuming that capital adjusts perfectly, the quasi-rents that unions target
are lower and therefore a higher bargaining power would be needed empirically to match the
data.
3μit = Pit
CQ,it refers to the mark-up of price (Pit) over marginal cost (CQ,it)
and αMit =
jitMit
PitQit. Maximization with respect to the wage rate and labor
respectively gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
wit = wit + γit
∙




wit = RN,it + φit
∙






1−φit. Eq. (4) states that the equilibrium wage is determined by
the outside wage in the event of a bargaining dispute, the relative bargaining
strength of the workers and the ﬁrm, and the level of proﬁts per employee.
Solving simultaneously (5) and (4) leads to an expression for the contract curve:
RN,it = wit, which shows that the ﬁrm decision about employment is the same
as if it was maximizing its short-run proﬁt at the outside wage. Expressing
the marginal revenue of labor as RN,it = RQ,itQN,it =
PitQN,it
μit and using this
expression together with (5), the elasticity of output with respect to employment
can be written as:
ε
Q
Nit = μitαNit + μitγit (αNit + αMit − 1) (6)
with αNit = witNit











the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
ε
Q
Kit =1− μitαMit − μitαNit − μitγit (αNit + αMit − 1) (7)
Estimating the following productivity equation:




Mit(mit − kit)+θit (8)
allows the identiﬁcation of (i) the mark-up of price over marginal cost and (ii)






























By embedding the eﬃcient bargaining model into a microeconomic version of
Hall’s (1988) framework, it follows that the ﬁrm price-cost mark-up and the
extent of rent sharing generate a wedge between output elasticities and factor
4shares. As a benchmark case, we assume that ﬁrms consider input prices as given
prior to deciding their level of inputs. In that case, short-run proﬁt maximization
with respect to labor would imply that ε
Q
Nit = μitαNit and estimating the
productivity equation would lead to the identiﬁcation of the price-cost mark-up
only (μonlyit).
2.2 Accounting approach
Dividing Eq. (4) by total revenue PitQit and deﬁning the wage premium as
the diﬀerence between the bargained wage and the outside wage in the event
of a bargaining dispute (WPit = wit − wit), we directly compute the price-cost
mark-up assuming that ﬁrms consider input prices as given prior to deciding
their level of inputs (μo n l y ait), the price-cost mark-up taking into account that








from the ﬁrm accounting information as
follows (see also Veugelers, 1989):
μo n l y ait =1+
µ





PitQit − witNit − jitMit
PitQit






PitQit − witNit − jitMit
=
μait − μo n l y ait






μait − μo n l y ait
μait − 1
(15)
where the outside wage wit is measured by the 5th percentile value of the nom-
inal wage per worker in the industry in which the ﬁrm operates.
2.3 Traditional labor economics approach
Following standard practice in the rent-sharing literature, we interpret wit as
the expected income in the event of a bargaining dispute which is determined
by productivity-related characteristics of the worker and the probability of be-
coming unemployed. Having longitudinal data, we assume that wit is captured
by year eﬀects and by a proxy of the wage outside the employing ﬁrm within
the same industry. Hence, the empirical speciﬁcation of Eq. (4) can be written
as:





+ αj(i) + αi + αt +  jt (16)
where wj(i)t is the annual nominal wage of individual j working in ﬁrm i at date
t, wIt is the 5th percentile value of the nominal wage per worker in industry I in
which the employing ﬁrm i operates at time t, πit and Nit are respectively the
proﬁts and employment of the employing ﬁrm i at time t, αj(i) is the individual
eﬀect, αi the ﬁrm eﬀect, αt the year eﬀect and  jt the statistical residual.
52.4 Right-to-manage versus eﬃcient bargaining
Equilibrium relation (4) is independent of the true nature of the employment
function. In particular, it does not depend on whether employment is deter-
mined at the labor demand curve (which would result from the right-to-manage
model where the workers and the ﬁrm bargain over wages in the ﬁrst stage, and
the ﬁrm retains the right to determine its optimal level of employment given the
wage in the second stage) or on a contract curve (which would result from the
eﬃcient bargaining model where bargaining is about wages and employment).
Contrary to Eq. (4) which would result as a ﬁrst-order condition from either the
right-to-manage model or the eﬃcient bargaining model, Eq. (6) discriminates
between the two standard models of rent sharing. In the right-to-manage model,
employment is highly endogenous with respect to wages. As in the perfectly
competitive labor market case, the marginal revenue of labor is equal to the
wage whereas in the eﬃcient bargaining model, employment does not depend
directly on the bargained wage. Hence, the null hypothesis of γit =0i nE q .( 6 )
does not only correspond to the assumption that the labor market is competitive
but also to the less restrictive assumption that ﬁrms and workers only bargain
over wages in a ﬁrst step and ﬁrms unilaterally determine their employment
level in a second step (right-to-manage assumption).
Given our purpose of providing micro-evidence on rent sharing from orthogonal
directions, we presume that the three approaches rely on the same model of
rent sharing. Hence, we assume that the workers and the ﬁrm are involved in
an eﬃcient bargaining procedure.
3D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n a n d a ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h et h r e e
approaches
3.1 Data description
We use data from the DADS (“D´ eclarations Annuelles des Donn´ ees Sociales”)
on the matched worker-ﬁrm side and ﬁrm accounting information from EAE
(“Enquˆ ete Annuelle d’Entreprise”, “Service des Etudes et Statistiques Indus-
trielles” (SESSI)) on the ﬁrm side. The DADS is a large-scale administrative
database collected by INSEE (“Institut de National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques”) and maintained in the Division des Revenus. The data
are based on a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings of each employee
subject to French payroll taxes. These taxes apply to essentially all employed
individuals in the economy. The Division des Revenus provides an extract of
the DADS for scientiﬁc purposes, covering all individuals employed in French
enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered years, excluding civil
servants.
Our analysis sample is obtained by merging the ﬁrm current account and balance
sheet data of the 10 646 ﬁrms, with the number of observations for each ﬁrm
6varying between 12 and 24, that we used in our previous research (Dobbelaere
and Mairesse, 2008) with the matched employer-employee information. Our ini-
tial data set contained 1 388 089 observations, each corresponding to a unique
ﬁrm-worker-year combination. Because of the 1982 and 1990 Census, however,
the 1981, 1983 and 1990 DADS data are excluded. To avoid large discrepancies
i nt h en u m b e ro fy e a r sa v a i l a b l ei nt h em a t c h e de m p l o y e r - e m p l o y e ed a t a s e ta n d
the ﬁrm dataset, we select the period 1984-2001. After some cleaning to elim-
inate outliers and anomalies, our matched worker-ﬁrm dataset contains 1 077
402 observations, corresponding to 209 780 individuals and 10 396 ﬁrms. For
each observation, we have information on the exact starting date and end date
of the job spell in the ﬁrm and the full-time/ part-time status of the worker.
Each ﬁrm-worker-year observation additionally includes information on the in-
dividual’s sex, month, year and place of birth, current occupation and total net
nominal earnings during the year for the individual. Employer characteristics
include the location and industry of the employing ﬁrm. 9.7% of the employees
move at least once between ﬁrms (movers).
For regression purposes, we only select full-time stayers who worked 12 months
ay e a r . O u rﬁnal sample contains 719 693 observations, corresponding to 91
353 individuals, 9 121 ﬁrms and 38 industries. Concerning the distribution of
workers across ﬁrms, we observe 2 workers per ﬁrm for ﬁrms in the ﬁrst quartile,
3w o r k e r sp e rﬁrm for ﬁrms in the second quartile and 7 workers per ﬁrm for
ﬁrms in the third quartile. The number of observations per worker (ﬁrm) is 7
(13) for the ﬁrst quartile of workers (ﬁrms), 10 (16) for the second quartile and
13 (16) for the third quartile.
Using the ﬁrm dataset, we measure output (Qit) by real current production
deﬂated by the two-digit producer price index of the French industrial classiﬁ-
cation. Labor (Nit) refers to the average number of employees in each ﬁrm for
each year and material input (Mit) refers to intermediate consumption deﬂated
by the two-digit intermediate consumption price index. The capital stock (Kit)
is measured by the gross bookvalue of ﬁxed assets. The shares of labor (αNit)
and material input (αMit) are constructed by dividing respectively the ﬁrm to-
tal labor cost and undeﬂated intermediate consumption by the ﬁrm undeﬂated
production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years. Proﬁts
p e rw o r k e r( πit
Nit) is measured as value added minus labor costs divided by the
average number of employees in each ﬁrm for each year. Using the matched
worker-ﬁrm dataset, the wage (wj(i)t) refers to the average net nominal wage
per worker. In addition to deﬁning the wage at the worker level, we compute
the ﬁrm average wage per worker in two wages: (i) computed directly from the
ﬁrm accounting information as the wage bill divided by the average number of
employees in each ﬁrm for each year (wit) and (ii) using the worker informa-
tion and computed as the sum of the workers’ wages divided by the number of








. By construction, the latter ﬁrm
average wage per worker is highly correlated with the average net nominal wage
7per worker (wj(i)t). Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and quartile
values of our main variables. The average growth rate of real ﬁrm output for the
overall sample is 2.6% per year over the period 1984-2001. Capital has remained
stable, while materials and labor have increased at an average annual growth
rate of 4% and 0.7% respectively. As expected for ﬁrm-level data, the disper-
sion of all these variables is considerably large. For example, capital growth is
smaller than -7.2% for the ﬁrst quartile of ﬁrms and higher than 6.5% for the
fourth quartile.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
3.2 A ﬁrst look at the three approaches
This section concentrates on across-industry heterogeneity in the extent of rent
sharing within each approach. We decompose the total sample into 38 manu-
facturing industries according to the French industrial classiﬁcation (”Nomen-
clature ´ economique de synth` ese - Niveau 3” [NES 114]). Table A.1 in Appendix
A shows the industry repartition of the sample and presents for each industry
t h en u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s( i nt h eﬁrm and matched worker-ﬁrm dataset), the
number of ﬁrms and the number of workers.
3.2.1 Productivity approach
Being interested in average reduced-form parameters, we estimate the following
speciﬁcation for each industry I over the period 1984-2001:
qit − kit = ε
Q
N (nit − kit)+ε
Q
M (mit − kit)+αt + ζit (17)
The average industry-level price-cost mark-up (ˆ μI), relative extent of rent shar-
ing (b γI) and extent of rent sharing (b φI) are derived from comparing the esti-



















and b φI =
e γI
1+e γI .
Table 2 summarizes the system GMM results of the industry analysis.2 The ta-
ble is drawn up in increasing order of b γI. From Table 2, it follows that industry
diﬀerences in the parameters are quite sizeable. Considering all industries, the
median price-cost mark-up and the median extent of rent sharing are estimated
at 1.21 and 0.19 respectively. Concentrating on the industry estimates for which
the price-cost mark-up equals or exceeds 1 and the corresponding extent of rent
2The GMM estimation is carried out in Stata 9.2 (Roodman, 2005). We report results for
the one-step estimator, for which inference based on the asymptotic variance matrix is shown
to be more reliable than for the asymptotically more eﬃcient two-step estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991). The speciﬁcation tests are passed in 25 out of 38 cases. Results not reported
but available upon request.
8sharing lies in the [0,1]-interval [22 industries], the price-cost mark-up (b μI)i s
estimated to be lower than 1.23 for the ﬁrst quartile of industries and higher
than 1.33 for the top quartile. The corresponding estimate of the extent of rent
sharing is found to be lower than 0.22 for the ﬁrst quartile of industries and
higher than 0.44 for the top quartile.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
3.2.2 Accounting approach
Table 3 presents for each industry I the distribution of the ﬁrm-level price-cost
mark-up assuming that ﬁrms consider input prices as given prior to deciding
their level of inputs (μo n l y aI), the price-cost mark-up taking into account that









. Table 3 is drawn up in increasing order of the





is computed to be lower than 1.17 for the ﬁrst quartile





is lower than 0.21 for the ﬁrst quartile of industries and
exceeds 0.48 for the upper quartile.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
3.2.3 Traditional labor economics approach
The proﬁt per worker variable ( πit
Nit)v a r i e sal o to v e rt i m e . W h e ne s t i m a t i n g
Eq. (16) for each industry I, we use the average of the proﬁt per worker variable
from time t until (t−4) as the main independent variable and assume that the
outside wage is entirely captured by year eﬀects.3 Table 4 presents the results
of estimating the wage equation. The left part uses the average net nominal
wage per worker (wj(i)t) as the dependent variable whereas the right part uses
the ﬁrm average wage per worker (wit) as the dependent variable.4 In Table
A.2 in Appendix we additionally present the results using the ﬁrm average wage









dependent variable.5 Within each part, the ﬁrst column reports the estimated
proﬁts-wage elasticity (επ
wI), the second column derives the corresponding rel-
a t i v ee x t e n to fr e n ts h a r i n g( γ
I) by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the
3Since the ﬁrm dataset covers the period 1978-2001, we also use the information over the
period 1978-1984 to compute our smooth proﬁt per worker measure.
4When using the worker wage as the dependent variable, the speciﬁcation tests are never
passed. On the contrary, when using the ﬁrm-average wage per worker as the dependent
variable, the speciﬁcation tests are passed in 35 out of the 38 cases. Results not reported but
available upon request.
5T a b l eA . 2i sd r a w nu pi ni n c r e a s i n go r d e ro fe γI using the average net nominal wage per
worker (wj(i)t) as the dependent variable (see Table 4). The speciﬁcation tests are passed in
37 out of the 38 cases.
9ratio of the ﬁrm-average wage per worker to the proﬁt per worker,6 and the
third column gives the corresponding extent of rent sharing (φ
I). The table
i sd r a w nu pi ni n c r e a s i n go r d e ro fb γI using the average net nominal wage per
worker (wj(i)t) as the dependent variable.
Focusing on the left part, except for one industry, the proﬁts-wage elasticity
is estimated to be positive. Th elasticitiy is estimated to be lower than 0.06
for the ﬁrst quartile of industries and higher than 0.15 for the upper quartile.
These elasticities are in line with previous studies (see Christoﬁdes and Oswald,
1992; Blanchﬂower et al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Arai, 2003). The
corresponding extent of rent sharing is lower than 0.10 for the ﬁrst quartile of
industries and exceeds 0.24 for the top quartile. Comparing these estimates
with the right part reveals that the estimated elasticities and the derived ex-
tent of rent-sharing parameters using the ﬁrm-average wage per worker as the
dependent variable are consistent with the ones using the worker wage as the
dependent variable. The former elasticity is estimated to be lower than 0.14 for
the ﬁrst quartile of industries and higher than 0.25 for the upper quartile.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
4 A comparison of the three diﬀerent approaches
In this section, we compare consistently estimates of rent sharing across the
three diﬀerent approaches. Table 5 presents the distribution of our parameter
of interest across the three approaches. For the traditional labor economics
approach, we compute the relative extent of rent-sharing parameters by multi-
plying the estimated proﬁts-wage elasticities by the median value of the smooth
ratio of the ﬁrm-average wage per worker to the proﬁt per worker at the industry
level. Likewise, we focus on the median values of the accounting (relative) extent
of rent sharing. The upper part of Table 5 shows the GMM results, the lower
part gives the OLS results. For each estimator, we consider (i) all industries
and (ii) a subsample of industries for which the relative extent of rent-sharing
parameters are estimated (or computed) to be positive across the diﬀerent ap-
proaches.7 This subsample contains 20 industries when focusing on the GMM
results and 22 industries when considering the OLS results. The left part of Ta-
ble 5 displays the distribution of the relative extent of rent-sharing parameters
whereas the right part gives the distribution of the rent-sharing parameter.
6Consistent with the smooth proﬁt per worker measure, we compute the average of this
ratio from time t until (t − 4).
7To deﬁne this subsample, we require that the estimated (or computed) relative extent
of rent sharing parameters are positive across the diﬀerent approaches and additionally for
each of the three variants of the traditional labor economics approach, i.e. for the wage








. The results of the latter are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix.
10Focusing on the upper-right part of the table and on the 38 industries, we observe
the most sizeable dispersion in the estimated extent of rent-sharing parameter
(b φI) within the productivity approach whereas the lowest dispersion is observed
within the accounting approach. The two variants of the traditional labor eco-
nomics approach display a comparable dispersion. Restricting the sample to
the economically meaningful parameter estimates reveals that the diﬀerences in
dispersion across the diﬀerent approaches become smaller but more importantly
that the rent-sharing estimates are within a comparable range. Concentrating
at the median values, we ﬁnd that these estimates lie in the [0.22,0.33]−range.
As could be expected, the OLS estimates of rent-sharing are lower compared
to the GMM estimates and display a larger discrepancy across the three ap-
proaches. As a graphical illustration, Figure 1 presents the box diagrams for
the subsample of the economically meaningful rent-sharing estimates. The up-
per diagram displays the GMM estimates whereas the lower diagram shows the
OLS estimates.
Table A.3 in Appendix presents the correlation between the estimates of (rel-
ative) exent of rent sharing across the three approaches. Consistent with the
discussion above, we consider the full sample and a subsample. Considering
the economically meaningful parameter estimates, the correlation between the
(relative) extent of rent sharing appears to be between 0.20 and 0.58 across
the diﬀerent approaches. As a graphical illustration, Figure A.1 in Appendix
plots the GMM results (economically meaningful parameter estimates) of (i) the
accounting extent of rent sharing versus the estimated extent of rent sharing us-
ing the traditional labor economics approach (worker wage), (ii) the estimated
extent of rent sharing using the productivity approach versus the estimated
extent of rent sharing using the traditional labor economics approach (worker
wage) and (iii) the estimated extent of rent sharing using the traditional labor
economics approach (ﬁrm wage) versus the estimated extent of rent sharing us-
ing the traditional labor economics approach (worker wage). The dashed lines
denote the median values.
5 Conclusion
This article provides evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal directions. Taking
advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for France, we compare
consistently across-industry heterogeneity in rent-sharing parameters relying on
three diﬀerent approaches: (i) the productivity approach, (ii) the accounting
approach and (ii) the traditional labor economics approach. We presume that
all three approaches rely on the same underlying rent-sharing model, i.e. the eﬃ-
cient bargaining model. Restricting the analysis to the economically meaningful
estimates of rent sharing, our main results reveal that there are diﬀerences in
dispersion of the estimates of rent sharing across the three diﬀerent approaches.
However, it is reassuring to ﬁnd that the rent-sharing estimates across the three
diﬀerent approaches are within a comparable range. Concentrating at the me-
11dian values, we ﬁnd that these estimates lie in the [0.22,0.33]-interval.
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Mean Sd. Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real ﬁrm output growth rate ∆qit 0.026 0.152 -0.055 0.024 0.108 125528
Labor growth rate ∆nit 0.007 0.123 -0.042 0.000 0.055 125528
Capital growth rate ∆kit 0.001 0.152 -0.072 -0.017 0.065 125528
Materials growth rate ∆mit 0.041 0.193 -0.060 0.038 0.141 125528
Labor share in nominal output αNit 0.310 0.135 0.214 0.295 0.389 132552
Materials share in nominal output αMit 0.517 0.155 0.420 0.524 0.624 132552
∆qit − ∆kit 0.026 0.189 -0.077 0.027 0.129 125528
∆nit − ∆kit 0.006 0.165 -0.075 0.012 0.087 125528
∆mit − ∆kit 0.040 0.221 -0.081 0.039 0.159 125528
Proﬁt per worker πit
Nit 21592 30658 6761 13529 25839 132552
Firm-average wage per worker wit 28346 8453 22480 27220 32817 132552




10 55 2 3 7 9121
Average wage per worker wj(i)t 17199 9237 11650 14794 19553 719693
14Table 2
Productivity approach: Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level mark-up ˆ µI (only) and extent of rent sharing ˆ φI
GMM SYS (t − 2)(t − 3)
Industry #F i r m s ˆ µI only ˆ µI b γI ˆ φI
Ind 1 276 0.966 (0.066) 0.841 (0.014) -1.289 (0.420) -4.460 (5.032)
Ind 3 96 1.254 (0.062) 1.047 (0.021) -0.792 (0.232) -3.811 (5.367)
Ind 32 149 1.126 (0.042) 1.014 (0.019) -0.410 (0.314) -0.696 (0.902)
Ind 10 102 1.244 (0.039) 1.111 (0.028) -0.405 (0.350) -0.682 (0.990)
Ind 17 136 1.089 (0.030) 1.039 (0.028) -0.347 (0.583) -0.531 (1.365)
Ind 19 159 1.239 (0.036) 1.142 (0.023) -0.341 (0.518) -0.517 (1.191)
Ind 25 93 1.073 (0.063) 0.968 (0.027) -0.309 (0.413) -0.448 (0.865)
Ind 4 105 1.265 (0.047) 1.180 (0.031) -0.287 (0.246) -0.402 (0.484)
Ind 14 117 1.134 (0.031) 1.058 (0.033) -0.282 (0.383) -0.394 (0.743)
Ind 9 125 1.326 (0.047) 1.215 (0.015) -0.260 (0.293) -0.351 (0.535)
Ind 21 133 1.198 (0.0483) 1.165 (0.028) -0.143 (0.470) -0.167 (0.641)
Ind 20 234 1.226 (0.035) 1.189 (0.020) -0.113 (0.456) -0.127 (0.580)
Ind 29 360 1.237 (0.031) 1.211 (0.014) -0.043 (0.170) -0.045 (0.185)
Ind 38 289 1.083 (0.033) 1.059 (0.016) -0.020 (0.303) -0.021 (0.316)
Ind 34 116 1.255 (0.047) 1.208 (0.021) -0.012 (0.247) -0.012 (0.253)
Ind 2 109 1.120 (0.050) 1.090 (0.016) -0.007 (0.280) -0.007 (0.284)
Ind 15 122 1.238 (0.036) 1.231 (0.017) 0.104 (0.274) 0.094 (0.225)
Ind 23 160 1.192 (0.049) 1.232 (0.019) 0.139 (0.362) 0.122 (0.279)
Ind 30 288 1.266 (0.033) 1.307 (0.015) 0.176 (0.119) 0.150 (0.086)
Ind 33 521 1.148 (0.025) 1.196 (0.014) 0.209 (0.234) 0.173 (0.160)
Ind 13 138 1.258 (0.063) 1.281 (0.029) 0.256 (0.249) 0.204 (0158)
Ind 31 180 1.136 (0.036) 1.210 (0.014) 0.285 (0.226) 0.222 (0.137)
Ind 28 277 1.207 (0.036) 1.213 (0.015) 0.333 (0.394) 0.250 (0.222)
Ind 7 186 1.160 (0.055) 1.194 (0.023) 0.368 (0.342) 0.269 (0.183)
Ind 24 159 1.156 (0.033) 1.266 (0.013) 0.374 (0.161) 0.272 (0.085)
Ind 11 286 1.261 (0.038) 1.303 (0.017) 0.407 (0.320) 0.289 (0.162)
Ind 5 427 1.126 (0.033) 1.231 (0.011) 0.458 (0.105) 0.314 (0.049)
Ind 36 812 1.139 (0.018) 1.238 (0.011) 0.466 (0.156) 0.318 (0.072)
Ind 26 334 1.228 (0.049) 1.393 (0.015) 0.499 (0.157) 0.333 (0.070)
Ind 35 126 1.246 (0.032) 1.333 (0.018) 0.563 (0.182) 0.360 (0.074)
Ind 37 518 1.260 (0.029) 1.473 (0.014) 0.668 (0.158) 0.400 (0.057)
Ind 12 163 1.285 (0.036) 1.442 (0.016) 0.742 (0.205) 0.426 (0.068)
Ind 18 247 1.106 (0.021) 1.209 (0.015) 0.775 (0.306 0.437 (0.097)
Ind 8 618 1.246 (0.020) 1.428 (0.008) 0.795 (0.143) 0.443 (0.045)
Ind 27 235 1.162 (0.027) 1.257 (0.011) 0.832 (0.356) 0.454 (0.106)
Ind 22 237 1.091 (0.032) 1.239 (0.012) 0.920 (0.295) 0.479 (0.080)
Ind 16 100 1.209 (0.040) 1.338 (0.018) 0.956 (0.268) 0.489 (0.070)
Ind 6 388 1.182 (0.033) 1.271 (0.009) 1.062 (0.209) 0.515 (0.049)
Mean 240 1.188 (0.039) 1.206 (0.018) 0.166 (0.287) 0.086 (0.586)
Median 172 1.202 (0.036) 1.212 (0.016) 0.193 (0.277) 0.188 (0.184)
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Instruments used: the lagged levels of qn , m and k dated (t−2) and (t−3) in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations and
the lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of q, n, m and k dated (t − 1) in the levels equations.
15Table 3
Accounting approach: Industry analysis:
Distribution of industry-level mark-up µaI (only) and extent of rent sharing φaI
µo n l y aI µaI γaI φaI
Industry Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Ind 4 1.110 1.159 1.218 1.137 1.198 1.251 0.085 0.350 0.085 0.086 0.171 0.244
Ind 2 1.089 1.129 1.173 1.114 1.159 1.205 0.063 0.379 0.063 0.080 0.186 0.280
Ind 3 1.136 1.207 1.272 1.200 1.260 1.327 0.121 0.395 0.121 0.130 0.186 0.277
Ind 30 1.155 1.189 1.228 1.213 1.250 1.298 0.191 0.453 0.191 0.171 0.240 0.313
Ind 34 1.126 1.157 1.224 1.176 1.222 1.290 0.171 0.509 0.171 0.163 0.266 0.357
Ind 24 1.175 1.220 1.274 1.235 1.295 1.351 0.143 0.543 0.143 0.138 0.246 0.341
Ind 15 1.127 1.164 1.217 1.180 1.229 1.291 0.153 0.599 0.153 0.147 0.253 0.363
Ind 23 1.101 1.158 1.233 1.213 1.272 1.146 -0.047 0.872 -0.047 0.156 0.371 0.657
Ind 32 1.128 1.179 1.254 1.193 1.249 1.319 0.180 0.710 0.180 0.153 0.267 0.365
Ind 29 1.145 1.173 1.213 1.201 1.235 1.283 0.202 0.537 0.202 0.177 0.257 0.337
Ind 1 1.087 1.117 1.208 1.117 1.160 1.271 0.143 0.632 0.143 0.151 0.272 0.426
Ind 26 1.137 1.193 1.265 1.200 1.265 1.355 0.191 0.690 0.191 0.188 0.280 0.397
Ind 31 1.117 1.161 1.225 1.183 1.232 1.304 0.172 0.723 0.172 0.208 0.312 0.413
Ind 33 1.108 1.145 1.199 1.172 1.219 1.275 0.193 0.781 0.193 0.199 0.315 0.439
Ind 37 1.145 1.185 1.247 1.218 1.281 1.360 0.231 0.719 0.231 0.189 0.305 0.413
Ind 10 1.127 1.175 1.221 1.204 1.262 1.322 0.234 0.955 0.234 0.210 0.330 0.491
Ind 19 1.084 1.135 1.222 1.159 1.222 1.316 0.167 0.949 0.167 0.201 0.352 0.536
Ind 14 1.101 1.129 1.197 1.164 1.201 1.259 0.191 0.809 0.191 0.216 0.325 0.466
Ind 9 1.141 1.192 1.254 1.221 1.284 1.344 0.254 0.694 0.254 0.211 0.299 0.427
Ind 5 1.105 1.142 1.228 1.176 1.232 1.315 0.205 0.898 0.205 0.191 0.317 0.460
Ind 13 1.104 1.164 1.254 1.201 1.256 1.341 0.265 0.913 0.265 0.215 0.331 0.524
Ind 38 1.087 1.128 1.196 1.179 1.232 1.299 0.061 1.008 0.061 0.267 0.447 0.631
Ind 25 1.109 1.159 1.250 1.186 1.255 1.365 0.127 0.766 0.127 0.265 0.336 0.494
Ind 7 1.106 1.145 1.194 1.173 1.214 1.278 0.198 0.825 0.198 0.195 0.324 0.460
Ind 22 1.073 1.109 1.174 1.165 1.209 1.283 0.174 1.341 0.174 0.223 0.434 0.601
Ind 20 1.073 1.098 1.159 1.151 1.187 1.250 0.194 1.226 0.194 0.235 0.435 0.598
Ind 17 1.067 1.086 1.134 1.125 1.152 1.213 0.234 1.116 0.234 0.235 0.392 0.589
Ind 35 1.121 1.140 1.178 1.171 1.217 1.252 0.257 0.865 0.257 0.243 0.326 0.434
Ind 27 1.082 1.118 1.176 1.143 1.190 1.276 0.217 1.019 0.217 0.236 0.389 0.560
Ind 12 1.105 1.148 1.198 1.184 1.240 1.298 0.215 0.958 0.215 0.246 0.364 0.508
Ind 8 1.110 1.146 1.189 1.202 1.254 1.311 0.183 1.278 0.183 0.268 0.430 0.578
Ind 11 1.095 1.124 1.171 1.171 1.213 1.270 0.306 1.101 0.306 0.274 0.388 0.534
Ind 21 1.076 1.104 1.161 1.143 1.187 1.263 0.095 1.117 0.095 0.257 0.419 0.563
Ind 36 1.120 1.147 1.185 1.198 1.244 1.301 0.321 1.056 0.321 0.264 0.395 0.517
Ind 16 1.071 1.103 1.147 1.160 1.213 1.276 0.042 1.370 0.042 0.313 0.529 0.707
Ind 6 1.094 1.121 1.170 1.180 1.223 1.283 0.319 1.313 0.319 0.292 0.445 0.575
Ind 28 1.083 1.122 1.179 1.176 1.227 1.298 0.179 1.292 0.179 0.296 0.450 0.606
Ind 18 1.063 1.086 1.122 1.148 1.189 1.230 0.220 1.842 0.220 0.341 0.530 0.692
Mean 1.107 1.146 1.205 1.177 1.227 1.294 0.183 0.456 0.884 0.211 0.340 0.478
Median 1.106 1.145 1.204 1.177 1.228 1.294 0.191 0.454 0.868 0.210 0.328 0.478
16Table 4
Labor economics approach: Industry analysis:
Estimated industry-level proﬁts-wage elasticity επ
wI a n de x t e n to fr e n ts h a r i n gφ
I









Ind 19 0.083 (0.018) -0.235 -0.307 0.071 (0.033) -1.044 23.73
Ind 17 -0.018 (0.026) -0.063 -0.067 -0.0002 (0.027) -0.001 -0.001
Ind 16 0.039 (0.011) 0.020 0.020 0.134 (0.050) 0.463 0.316
Ind 14 0.021 (0.007) 0.021 0.020 0.131 (0.029) 0.372 0.271
Ind 13 0.022 (0.035) 0.047 0.045 0.053 (0.031) 0.144 0.126
Ind 2 0.061 (0.024) 0.058 0.055 0.077 (0.036) 0.087 0.080
Ind 22 0.019 (0.015) 0.061 0.058 0.048 (0.028) 0.210 0.174
Ind 10 0.045 (0.021) 0.074 0.069 0.098 (0.047) 0.181 0.154
Ind 12 0.046 (0.021) 0.098 0.089 0.113 (0.033) 0.317 0.240
Ind 34 0.065 (0.017) 0.108 0.098 0.045 (0.037) 0.073 0.068
Ind 15 0.095 (0.014) 0.109 0.099 0.100 (0.031) 0.142 0.124
Ind 1 0.076 (0.024) 0.121 0.108 0.088 (0.026) 0.170 0.145
Ind 3 0.144 (0.018) 0.121 0.108 0.198 (0.040) 0.219 0.179
Ind 21 0.049 (0.023) 0.132 0.117 0.048 (0.029) 0.147 0.128
Ind 9 0.101 (0.024) 0.134 0.118 0.132 (0.040) 0.200 0.167
Ind 24 0.118 (0.041) 0.160 0.138 0.152 (0.042) 0.231 0.188
Ind 29 0.108 (0.042) 0.164 0.141 0.185 (0.040) 0.299 0.230
Ind 4 0.246 (0.053) 0.181 0.153 0.046 (0.042) 0.043 0.041
Ind 30 0.168 (0.024) 0.196 0.164 0.123 (0.028) 0.166 0.142
Ind 11 0.095 (0.027) 0.121 0.175 0.061 (0.027) 0.179 0.152
Ind 23 0.105 (0.008) 0.220 0.180 0.068 (0.022) 0.329 0.248
Ind 28 0.095 (0.022) 0.236 0.191 0.144 (0.031) 0.461 0.315
Ind 20 0.092 (0.022) 0.266 0.210 0.059 (0.026) 0.223 0.182
Ind 38 0.134 (0.011) 0.271 0.213 0.102 (0.022) 0.284 0.221
Ind 5 0.210 (0.016) 0.288 0.224 0.150 (0.021) 0.330 0.248
Ind 32 0.197 (0.028) 0.289 0.224 0.104 (0.043) 0.176 0.149
Ind 33 0.150 (0.026) 0.293 0.227 0.074 (0.028) 0.168 0.144
Ind 25 0.191 (0.018) 0.299 0.230 0.156 (0.030) 0.353 0.261
Ind 36 0.124 (0.031) 0.308 0.236 -0.022 (0.027) -0.054 -0.057
Ind 7 0.154 (0.023) 0.316 0.240 0.137 (0.035) 0.357 0.263
Ind 8 0.113 (0.023) 0.317 0.241 0.099 (0.038) 0.274 0.215
Ind 37 0.180 (0.026) 0.323 0.244 0.111 (0.033) 0.223 0.183
Ind 6 0.108 (0.021) 0.337 0.252 0.236 (0.023) 0.940 0.485
Ind 31 0.190 (0.009) 0.337 0.252 0.162 (0.031) 0.297 0.229
Ind 27 0.140 (0.026) 0.349 0.259 0.126 (0.030) 0.354 0.262
Ind 26 0.223 (0.019) 0.362 0.266 0.104 (0.024) 0.190 0.160
Ind 35 0.135 (0.024) 0.435 0.303 0.104 (0.035) 0.407 0.289
Ind 18 0.175 (0.013) 0.835 0.455 0.053 (0.025) 0.282 0.220
Mean 0.113 (0.022) 0.205 0.154 0.102 (0.032) 0.216 0.807
Median 0.108 (0.022) 0.204 0.169 0.103 (0.031) 0.221 0.183
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Instruments used: the lagged levels of qn , m and k dated (t−2) and (t−3) in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations and
the lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of q, n, m and k dated (t − 1) in the levels equations.
17Table 5
Comparison of distribution of (relative) extent of rent sharing γ
I (φ
I) across the three approaches
GMM SYS (t − 2)(t − 3) GMM SYS (t − 2)(t − 3)
#I n d . Estimate Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Estimate Mean Q1 Q2 Q3
38 Accounting γaI 0.456 0.347 0.454 0.532 Accounting φaI 0.339 0.271 0.327 0.395
38 Productivity b γI 0.166 -0.260 0.193 0.499 Productivity b φI 0.086 -0.167 0.188 0.360
38 Wage worker b γI 0.201 0.108 0.193 0.293 Wage worker b φI 0.201 0.108 0.193 0.293
38 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.182 0.133 0.160 0.239 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.182 0.133 0.160 0.239
20 Accounting γaI 0.493 0.374 0.459 0.579 Accounting φaI 0.357 0.308 0.328 0.409
20 Productivity b γI 0.500 0.271 0.432 0.758 Productivity b φI 0.311 0.213 0.302 0.431
20 Wage worker b γI 0.249 0.159 0.258 0.306 Wage worker b φI 0.249 0.159 0.258 0.306
20 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.226 0.139 0.216 0.256 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.226 0.139 0.216 0.256
OLS lev OLS lev
38 Accounting γaI 0.456 0.347 0.454 0.532 Accounting φaI 0.340 0.272 0.328 0.395
38 Productivity b γI 0.033 -0.146 0.100 0.250 Productivity b φI 0.068 -0.115 0.108 0.208
38 Wage worker b γI 0.151 0.090 0.140 0.193 Wage worker b φI 0.151 0.090 0.140 0.193
38 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.198 0.149 0.200 0.231 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.198 0.149 0.200 0.231
22 Accounting γaI 0.493 0.439 0.460 0.569 Accounting φaI 0.368 0.315 0.347 0.429
22 Productivity b γI 0.271 0.134 0.225 0.214 Productivity b φI 0.198 0.118 0.183 0.261
22 Wage worker b γI 0.221 0.181 0.213 0.248 Wage worker b φI 0.171 0.130 0.162 0.214
22 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.226 0.139 0.216 0.256 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.221 0.181 0.213 0.248
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Source:  Own estimates 
Fig. 1a: GMM estimates of rent-sharing across the three approaches
phi accounting phi productivity







Source:  Own estimates 
Fig. 1b: OLS estimates of rent-sharing across the three approaches
phi accounting phi productivity
phi worker wage phi firm wageAppendix: Detailed results
Table A.1
Industry repartition
Industry Code Name # Firms # Workers
#O b s .
Firm
dataset




Ind 1 B01 Meat preparations 276 2006 3913 13514
Ind 2 B02 Milk products 109 1716 1603 13269
Ind 3 B03 Beverages 96 1297 1390 10118
Ind 4 B04 Food production for animals 105 721 1516 5479
Ind 5 B05-B06 Other food products 427 3492 6153 26601
Ind 6 C11 Clothing and skin goods 388 2407 5333 17234
Ind 7 C12 Leather goods and footwear 186 1328 2680 10471
Ind 8 C20 Publishing, (re)printing 618 3427 8834 25286
Ind 9 C31 Pharmaceutical products 125 2738 1779 20113
Ind 10 C32 Soap, perfume and maintenance products 102 1699 1518 13583
Ind 11 C41 Furniture 286 2001 4189 16353
Ind 12 C42, C44-C46 Accommodation equipment 163 1892 2370 15976
Ind 13 C43 Sport articles, games and other products 138 913 1942 6938
Ind 14 D01 Motor vehicles 117 9342 1725 77448
Ind 15 D02 Transport equipment 122 2788 1848 21494
Ind 16 E11-E14 Ship building, aircraft and railway construction 100 3793 1492 26316
Ind 17 E21 Metal products for construction 136 669 1956 4679
Ind 18 E22 Ferruginous and steam boilers 247 1610 3609 11364
Ind 19 E23 Mechanical equipment 159 2027 2412 16898
Ind 20 E24 Machinery for general usage 234 1942 3367 15490
Ind 21 E25-E26 Agriculture machinery 133 752 1910 5696
Ind 22 E27-E28 Other machinery for speciﬁc usage 237 1598 3425 12955
Ind 23 E31-E35 Electric and electronic machinery 160 2381 2289 15450
Ind 24 F11-F12 Mineral products 159 641 2332 4763
Ind 25 F13 Glass products 93 1916 1382 17855
Ind 26 F14 Earthenware products and construction material 334 2824 4878 21471
Ind 27 F21 Textile art 235 1940 3322 13583
Ind 28 F22-F23 Textile products and clothing 277 2227 3943 16788
Ind 29 F31 Wooden products 360 1317 5267 10579
Ind 30 F32-F33 Paper and printing products 288 2692 4247 22810
Ind 31 F41-F42 Mineral and organic chemical products 180 5338 2718 52625
Ind 32 F43-F45 Parachemical and rubber products 149 1780 2216 13824
Ind 33 F46 Transformation of plastic products 521 3233 7710 25874
Ind 34 F51-F52 Steel products, non-ferrous metals 116 2746 1704 22452
Ind 35 F53 Ironware 126 1120 1887 9277
Ind 36 F54 Industrial service to metal products 812 2925 11880 22946
Ind 37 F55-F56 Metal products, recuperation 518 3277 7563 25843
Ind 38 F61-F62 Electrical goods and components 289 4838 4250 36278
20Table A.2








as the ﬁrm-average wage per worker
Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level proﬁts-wage elasticity επ
wI a n de x t e n to fr e n ts h a r i n gφ
I






Ind 19 0.065 (0.034) -0.970 -31.895
Ind 17 -0.015 (0.044) -0.055 -0.058
Ind 16 0.114 (0.060) 0.394 0.283
Ind 14 0.037 (0.038) 0.372 0.095
Ind 13 0.096 (0.058) 0.258 0.205
Ind 2 0.104 (0.053) 0.117 0.105
Ind 22 -0.041 (0.043) -0.179 -0.219
Ind 10 0.053 (0.066) 0.099 0.090
Ind 12 0.098 (0.057) 0.276 0.216
Ind 34 0.033 (0.047) 0.055 0.052
Ind 15 0.087 (0.041) 0.124 0.110
Ind 1 0.118 (0.047) 0.227 0.185
Ind 3 0.205 (0.055) 0.227 0.185
Ind 21 0.088 (0.039) 0.270 0.212
Ind 9 0.085 (0.062) 0.128 0.114
Ind 24 0.122 (0.064) 0.186 0.157
Ind 29 0.134 (0.063) 0.217 0.178
Ind 4 -0.005 (0.050) -0.005 -0.005
Ind 30 0.156 (0.052) 0.211 0.174
Ind 11 0.072 (0.044) 0.211 0.174
Ind 23 0.068 (0.037) 0.327 0.247
Ind 28 0.024 (0.045) 0.078 0.072
Ind 20 0.099 (0.035) 0.373 0.272
Ind 38 0.112 (0.035) 0.313 0.238
Ind 5 0.099 (0.039) 0.218 0.179
Ind 32 0.134 (0.062) 0.227 0.185
Ind 33 0.140 (0.046) 0.319 0.242
Ind 25 0.058 (0.045) 0.131 0.116
Ind 36 0.114 (0.045) 0.283 0.221
Ind 7 0.073 (0.050) 0.190 0.159
Ind 8 0.055 (0.059) 0.152 0.132
Ind 37 0.182 (0.064) 0.365 0.267
Ind 6 0.153 (0.026) 0.609 0.379
Ind 31 0.183 (0.047) 0.337 0.252
Ind 27 0.058 (0.048) 0.164 0.141
Ind 26 0.131 (0.036) 0.241 0.194
Ind 35 0.085 (0.050) 0.333 0.250
Ind 18 0.007 (0.049) 0.038 0.036
Mean 0.089 (0.048) 0.173 -0.686
Median 0.092 (0.047) 0.214 0.176
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Instruments used: the lagged levels of qn , m and k dated (t−2) and (t−3) in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equations and
the lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of q, n, m and k dated (t − 1) in the levels equations.
21Table A.3
Correlation of (relative) extent of rent sharing estimates γ
I (φ
I) across the three approaches
GMM SYS (t − 2)(t − 3) GMM SYS (t − 2)(t − 3)
# Ind. Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI
38 Accounting γaI 1.000 Accounting φaI 1.000
38 Productivity b γI 0.539 1.000 Productivity b φI 0.202 1.000
38 Wage worker b γI 0.447 0.387 1.000 Wage worker b φI 0.335 0.109 1.000
38 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.424 0.430 0.293 1.000 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.384 0.090 0.293 1.000
Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI
20 Accounting γaI 1.000 Accounting φaI 1.000
20 Productivity b γI 0.668 1.000 Productivity b φI 0.625 1.000
20 Wage worker b γI 0.501 0.295 1.000 Wage worker b φI 0.342 0.331 1.000
20 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.571 0.682 0.156 1.000 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.522 0.628 0.156 1.000
OLS lev OLS lev
Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI
38 Accounting γaI 1.000 Accounting φaI 1.000
38 Productivity b γI 0.382 1.000 Productivity b φI 0.016 1.000
38 Wage worker b γI 0.464 0.358 1.000 Wage worker b φI 0.319 0.052 1.000
38 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.698 0.487 0.662 1.000 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.590 0.062 0.662 1.000
Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI Estimate Accounting γaI Productivity b γI Wage worker b γI Wage ﬁrm b γI
22 Accounting γaI 1.000 Accounting φaI 1.000
22 Productivity b γI 0.340 1.000 Productivity b φI 0.350 1.000
22 Wage worker b γI 0.450 0.197 1.000 Wage worker b φI 0.204 0.219 1.000
22 Wage ﬁrm b γI 0.539 0.522 0.578 1.000 Wage ﬁrm b φI 0.342 0.485 0.578 1.000
22                                                                           23 
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Fig. A.1c: Phi firm wage - phi worker wage
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